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THE CASE AGAINST RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
David R. Schmahmann* 
Lori J. Polacheck** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In pressing the boundaries of existing statutory and common law, 
proponents of radical change in the way humans interact with animals 
seek to have our institutions take an unprecedented step: to endow 
animals with legal rights.1 What this means-what "rights" for ani-
mals unavoidably entails as a matter of constitutional and civil law-
raises issues that go to the core of our assumptions about ourselves 
and about the nature, aims, and limits of our institutions. 
The term "animal rights" poses vexing definitional issues, and these 
issues are complicated by the imprecision with which the term is so 
often used. Many people loosely associate "animal rights" with the 
idea that people have a moral, legal, or custodial duty to treat animals 
humanely. Such a gloss allows the notion of rights for animals to 
appear mainstream and to elicit support across a broad spectrum. 
Peter Singer, who first articulated the ethical basis upon which much 
of the contemporary animal rights movement rests, prefers to avoid 
the use of the word "rights" altogether. "The language of rights is a 
convenient political shorthand[,]" Singer wrote in his seminal book, 
* David R. Schmahmann is a partner in the firm of Nutter, McLennan & Fish. 
** Lori J. Polacheck is an associate in the firm of Nutter, McClennan & Fish. The views 
expressed in this article are the authors' and not those of their firm. 
1 See, for example, the comments of Joyce Tischler, Executive Director of the Animal Legal 
Defense Fund (ALDF), in ANIMALS' ADVOCATE, Winter 1994, at 2, 2. Lawsuits brought by the 
ALDF, Tischler declared, are for the purpose of "protecting animals and laying the groundwork 
for the establishment of their legal rights." [d.; see Chimpanzees as Persons, ANIMALS' ADVOC., 
Winter 1994, at 1, 1, 7. Likewise, in the ALDF's 1991 Annual Report, President Steven Wise 
wrote that the ALDF was working to establish firmly the concept of "legal rights" for animals. 
ANIMAL LEAGUE DEFENSE FUND, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1991). 
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Animal Liberation.2 "It is even more valuable in the era of thirty-sec-
ond TV news clips than it was in [Jeremy] Bentham's day; but in the 
argument for a radical change in our attitude to animals, it is in no 
way necessary."3 
Lawyers, however, in analyzing issues of animal ''liberation'' (Singer's 
preferred term), often find "rights language" indispensable. In an 
article advocating rights for natural objects, Professor Christopher 
Stone articulates his common understanding of the meaning of "rights" 
in this context.4 Professor Stone argues that animals should be "hold-
ers of legal rights" and that an entity cannot be said to hold legal 
rights unless a public authoritative body is prepared to review con-
duct inconsistent with those rights.5 Further, each of the following 
three additional criteria must be satisfied: "[F]irst, that the thing can 
institute legal actions at its behest; second, that in determining the 
granting of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into account; 
and, third, that relief must run to the benefit of it."6 
Radical changes in our legal institutions would be necessary if 
animals were to be "holders of legal rights" as so defined. Proponents 
of animal rights strongly advocate just such changes and an outcome 
in which our legal institutions would serve the perceived interests of 
animals as readily as legal institutions presently serve human inter-
ests. As one commentator has explained: 
Time and time again, without exception, animals are denied the 
independent jural standing they deserve and are, instead, system-
atically treated as if they deserve the law's attention or [protec-
tion] only if some human interest is harmed or benefited-for 
example, our interests in property, or our recreational or aesthetic 
interests. Thus does existing law continue to foster the no longer 
tenable moral belief that all our duties to animals are indirect 
duties. In doing so, the law continues to perpetuate a system that 
is, in this respect, unjust to the core. For the justice of how 
animals are treated by us must be fixed by how they are benefited 
or harmed, not by whether we care about this.7 
2 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 8 (2d ed. 1990). 
3 [d. 
4 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 458 (1972). 
5 See id. 
6 [d. (emphasis in original). 
7 Tom Regan, Progress Without Pain: The Argument for Humane Treatment of Research 
Animals, 31 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 513, 517 (1987). 
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To facilitate the idea of animals as "jural persons"8 and to shift the 
focus to the harm or benefits to animals, numerous commentators-
and some lawyers in cases in litigation-have recommended the crea-
tion of guardians hips for animals.9 Some people have also advocated 
a shift in the focus of legal proceedings from the impact on humans to 
the impact on animals.lO 
This Article explores the issue of legal rights for animals. Section 
II provides a brief overview of the foundations of animal rights the-
ory. Section III discusses some of the critical flaws in the arguments 
animal rights advocates make in opposition to the use of animals in 
medical research. Section IV identifies ways in which the concept of 
legal rights for animals would threaten the delicate balance of power 
between government and individuals. Section V summarizes the ex-
isting laws that govern our treatment of animals and shows that such 
laws fail to recognize legal rights for animals in the sense dicussed 
above. Finally, Section VI explains how the doctrine of standing helps 
to insure that our court system does not become a forum for interspe-
cies disputes. 
It is our thesis that it would be both implausible and dangerous to 
give or attribute legal rights to animals because such extension of 
legal rights would have serious, detrimental impacts on human rights 
and freedoms. This Article is not, however, aimed at those who urge 
that we interact with animal life in ways that are humane, esthetic, 
and environmentally sound. Nor is this Article aimed at those who 
worry that society's present ways of producing food and conducting 
research may be wasteful and disruptive of nature's balance. Instead, 
this Article is aimed at those who believe that every individual animal, 
in itself, possesses certain rights which, when violated, give rise to 
claims that may be pursued legally at the animal's "behest" and for 
relief running to the animal's "benefit." 
8 See generally Stone, supra note 4, at 464-73; Brenda L. Thomas, Comment, Antinomy: The 
Use, Rights, and Regulation of Laboratory Animals, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 739 (1986); Joyce 
S. Tischler, Comment, Rights for Nonhuman Animals: A Guardianship Model for Dogs and 
Cats, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 484, 500-06 (1977). Professor Stone even extends the concept of 
endowing legal rights to non-humans beyond the judicial system and into the electoral system. 
"I am suggesting," Stone writes, "that there is nothing unthinkable about, and there might on 
balance even be a prevailing case to be made for, an electoral apportionment that made some 
systematic effort to allow for the representative 'rights' of non-human life." Stone, supra note 
4, at 487. 
9 See, e.g., Tischler, supra note 8, at 500-06. 
10 See infra notes 135--54 and 164---u8 and accompanying text. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORY AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS 
The entire edifice of animal rights theory, it seems, rests on the 
notion that animals, if mistreated, suffer as do humans: 
Animal rights are built upon a misconceived premise that rights 
were created to prevent us from unnecessary suffering. You can't 
find an animal rights book, video, pamphlet, or rock concert in 
which someone doesn't mention the Great Sentence, written by 
Jeremy Bentham in 1789. Arguing in favor of such rights Ben-
tham wrote "The question is not can they reason? nor, can they 
talk? but, can they suffer?" 
The logic of the animal rights movement places suffering at the 
iconographic center of a skewed value system.ll 
Whether or not animals suffer, however, only begins the analysis. 
As interesting as it is to dwell on the relative capacities for suffering 
of various species12 and the possibility that some animals may suffer 
less under human control than when left alone,13 the ability to suffer 
cannot, standing alone, be the sole tool with which access to legal 
rights and remedies is analyzed.14 While the capacity for suffering 
may be a common denominator of humans and animals, and is easily 
polemicized, legal rights have their origins in and are intertwined with 
a multitude of complex and subtle concepts that may include, but are 
in no means limited to, suffering.15 
Perhaps because the common view of the moral and legal status of 
animals is based on a bright line separating animals from people, 
animal rights activists are preoccupied with the similarities between 
animals and people. Some animal rights theorists contend that at least 
some animals have the capacity for reasoning, language, and self-con-
11 Vickie Hearne, What's Wrong with Animal Rights?, HARPERS, Sept. 1991, at 59, 60 (em-
phasis in original). 
12 ANDREW N. ROWAN, OF MICE, MODELS, AND MEN: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF ANIMAL 
RESEARCH 74-90 (1984). 
13 Hearne, supra note 11, at 61. 
14 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 4, at 479 n.93 (regarding the possibility of plants feeling pain). 
15 
Dogs can have elaborate conceptions of human social structures, and even of something 
like their rights and responsibilities within them, but these conceptions are never 
elaborate enough to construct a rights relationship between a dog and the state, or a 
dog and the Humane Society. Both of these are concepts that depend on writing and 
memoranda, officers in uniform, plaques and seals of authority. All of these are literary 
constructs, and all of them are beyond a dog's ken .... 
Hearne, supra note 11, at 62"'{;3. 
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sciousness and therefore can and should be holders of legal rights.16 
Professor Tom Regan argues that because animals are "the experi-
encing subjects of a life" and may directly be benefited and harmed 
by human acts and conduct, people owe direct moral duties to animals 
which translate into animal rights.17 
Yet, the differences between humans and animals cannot be ig-
nored, and those differences have made possible all of civilized life. 
Furthermore, while there are as many formulations of what makes 
humans "human" as there are philosophers who have considered the 
subject,tB it is a central feature of animal rights theory-and its major 
danger-to dismiss as high sounding rhetoric any attempt to catalog 
those features that do indeed distinguish humans from animals. 
In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer deftly attempts to discount 
rebuttals to his central thesis that "I have and know of nothing which 
enables me to say, a priori, that a human life of any quality, however 
low, is more valuable than an animal life of any quality, however 
high."19 Singer writes that "[t]o introduce ideas of dignity and worth 
as a substitute for other reasons for distinguishing humans and ani-
mals is not good enough. Fine phrases are the last resource of those 
who have run out of arguments."20 Even relatively moderate commen-
tators like Andrew Rowan concede the battleground on this point: 
The various criteria mentioned above [rationality, linguistic abil-
ity, the human soul, a God-granted dominion over animals, or the 
fact that humans are unique in being moral agents as well as 
objects of moral concern] which have been proposed as conferring 
a unique moral status on humans have all been strongly chal-
16 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Research on Animals: Values, Politics and Regulatory Reform, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1171 (1985); Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights, 18 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 280--81 (1987). 
17 Regan, supra note 7, at 516. 
18 Singer and Rowan are but two of the authorities on animal rights who discuss the evolution 
of this issue insofar as it pertains to animals and their place in human structures. See generally 
ROWAN, supra note 12; SINGER, supra note 2. Humorist P. J. O'Rourke has mused: 
Screw the rights of nature. Nature will have rights as soon as it gets duties. The minute 
we see birds, trees, bugs and squirrels picking up litter, giving money to charity, and 
keeping an eye on our kids at the park, we'll let them vote. 
P.J. O'Rourke, Save the Planet? We're All Going to Die Anyway, Providence Phoenix, Sept. 8, 
1994, at 6 (quoting then-forthcoming version of P. J. O'ROURKE, ALL THE TROUBLE IN THE 
WORLD: THE LIGHTER SIDE OF OVERPOPULATION, FAMINE, ECOLOGICAL DISASTER, ETHNIC 
HATRED, PLAGUE, AND POVERTY (1994». 
19 SINGER, supra note 2, at 242 (quoting R.G. Frey, Vivisection, Morals and Medicine, 9 J. 
MED. ETHICS 95-104 (1983». 
2°Id. at 239. Susan Goodkin likewise questions the idea that men and women possess any 
"unique worth" or "inherent dignity." See Goodkin, supra note 16, at 281-82. 
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lenged in the last decade. In most cases, I believe, they have been 
found deficient.21 
Singer is right, of course, that once one dismisses Hebrew thought;22 
the teachings of J esus;23 the views of St. Aquinas, St. Francis, Ren-
aissance writers, and Darwin;24 and an entire "ideology whose history 
we have traced back to the Bible and the ancient Greeks"25-in short, 
once one dismisses innate human characteristics, the ability to ex-
press reason, to recognize moral principles, to make subtle distinc-
tions, and to intellectualize-there is no way to support the view that 
humans possess rights but animals do not. 
In the end, however, it is the aggregate of these characteristics that 
does render humans fundamentally, importantly, and unbridgeably 
different from animals, even though it is also beyond question that in 
individual instances-for example, in the case of vegetative individu-
als-some animals may indeed have higher cognitive skills than some 
humans. To argue on that basis alone, however, that human institu-
tions are morally flawed because they rest on assumptions regarding 
the aggregate of human abilities, needs, and actions is to deny such 
institutions the capacity to draw any distinctions at all. Consider the 
consequences of a theory which does not distinguish between animal 
life and human life for purposes of identifying and enforcing legal 
rights. Every individual member of every species would have recog-
nized claims against human beings and the state, and perhaps other 
animals as well. As the concept of rights expanded to include the 
"claims" of all living creatures, the concept would lose much of its 
force, and human rights would suffer as a consequence. Long before 
Singer wrote Animal Liberation, one philosopher wrote: 
If it is once observed that there is no difference in principle 
between the case of dogs, cats, or horses, or stags, foxes, and 
hares, and that of tsetse-flies or tapeworms or the bacteria in our 
own blood-stream, the conclusion likely to be drawn is that there 
is so much wrong that we cannot help doing to the brute creation 
that it is best not to trouble ourselves about it any more at all. 
The ultimate sufferers are likely to be our fellow men, because 
the final conclusion is likely to be, not that we ought to treat the 
21 ROWAN, supra note 12, at 258. 
22 SINGER, supra note 2, at 188 ("there is no serious challenge to the overall view, laid down 
in Genesis, that the human species is the pinnacle of creation and has God's permission to kill 
and eat other animals."). 
23 [d. at 191 ("Jesus himself is described as showing apparent indifference to the fate of 
non-humans."). 
24 See id. at 195, 198-99, 211. 
25 [d. at 213. 
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brutes like human beings, but that there is no good reason why 
we should not treat human beings like brutes. Extension of this 
principle leads straight to Belsen and Buchenwald, Dachau and 
Auschwitz, where the German and the Jew or Pole only took the 
place of the human being and the Colorado beetle.26 
To some extent, it is a challenge to the value of civilization to 
dismiss the Judeo-Christian ethic as anthropocentric or speciesist27 
and thus deficient, and to minimize the significance of the capacity to 
express reason, to recognize moral principles, and to plan for ordered 
coexistence in a complex technological society. "The core of this book," 
Singer writes in Animal Liberation, "is the claim that to discriminate 
against beings solely on account of their species is a form of prejudice, 
immoral and indefensible in the same way that discrimination on the 
basis of race is immoral and indefensible."28 Such an equation, how-
ever, allows Ingrid Newkirk, founder of People for the Ethical Treat-
ment of Animals (PETA), to state that "[sJix million Jews died in 
concentration camps, but six billion broiler chickens will die this year 
in slaughter houses."29 The only "pure" human being, Newkirk has 
theorized, is a dead one. "[O]nly dead people are true purists, feeding 
the earth and living beings rather than taking from them .... We 
know it is impossible to breathe without hurting or exploiting."30 
These forms of doctrinaire "animal rightism" ignore the value that 
society has placed on human life which enables society to function in 
an orderly fashion. In effect, the extreme positions of animal rights 
activists devalue human life and detract from human rights.3! "The 
belief that human life, and only human life, is sacrosanct is a form of 
26 A.M. MacIver, Ethics and the Beetle, in ETHICS 527, 528 (Judith Thompson & Gerald 
Dworkin eds., 1968). 
27 See SINGER, supra note 2, at 185. 
28 I d. at 243. 
29 Chip Brown, She's a Portrait of Zealotry in Plastic Shoes, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1983, at 
Bl. 
30 Ingrid Newkirk, Total Victory, Like Checkmate, Cannot Be Achieved in One Move, ANI-
MALS' AGENDA, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 43, 44. 
31 In The Hijacking of the Humane Movement, Rod and Patti Strand establish that animal 
protection was a Third Reich legislative priority and that vegetarianism was practiced by many 
elite Nazis, including Adolf Hitler. ROD STRAND & PATTI STRAND, THE HIJACKING OF THE 
HUMANE MOVEMENT 26-29 (1993). Vegetarianism was considered "a sign of purity and eating 
meat ... a symbol of decaying civilizations that still practiced dominationist attitudes over 
animals." Id. at 29. 
Id. 
Who could have imagined that by elevating animals in relationship to people that the 
relative value of people would have decreased as well? Who would have foreseen that 
Hitler's statement that 'men should not feel so superior to animals' represents a 
warning? 
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speciesism," Singer writes.32 But if the sacredness of all life is equiva-
lent, what is one to make of animals that kill each other and the often 
arbitrary nature of life and death and survival of the fittest in the 
wild? What is one to make of the conflict between the seeming arbi-
trariness of the killing that takes place in nature and the ethical 
content of human existence that starts with the certainty that the life 
of every individual person is uniquely sacred? 
Sometimes the statements of contemporary radical environmental-
ists and animal rights activists display a profound misanthropy. "If 
radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human 
population back to ecological sanity, it would probably be something 
like AIDS," writes one author using the pseudonym Miss Ann Thropy.33 
"Seeing no other possibility for the preservation of biological diversity 
on earth than a drastic decline in the number of humans, Miss Ann 
Thropy contends that AIDS is ideal for the task primarily because 
'the disease only affects humans' and shows promise for wiping out 
large numbers of humans."34 Ingrid Newkirk has commented that 
even if animal research resulted in a cure for AIDS, PETA would "be 
against it."35 
The point is that reverence for human life must be both the starting 
point and the reference point for any ethical philosophy and system 
of law that does not immediately become unhitched from its moorings 
in civilization. With respect to animals and their similarities to hu-
mans, Singer's dismissal of "fine phrases" notwithstanding, the fact 
that debate exists about the ethical consequences of such differences 
is almost distinction enough. It is we-humans-who are having the 
debate, not animals; and it is a unique feature of humankind to recog-
nize ethical subtleties. This ability to recognize gradations and com-
peting interests is what defines the rules that we live by and the 
system of rights and responsibilities that comprise our legal system. 
Animals cannot possess rights because animals are in no way a part 
32 SINGER, supra note 2, at 18. 
33 RIK SCARCE, ECO-WARRIORS: UNDERSTANDING THE RADICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MOVE-
MENT 92 (1990) (quoting Miss Ann Thropy, Population and AIDS, EARTH FIRST! J., May 1, 
1987, at 5, 32). 
34Id. Miss Ann Thropy is not alone in her views: 
Id. 
In a 1986 interview ... that was published in the Australian magazine Simply Living, 
[Dave] Foreman (founder of Earth First!) said that "the worst thing we could do in 
Ethiopia is to give aid-the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, 
to let the people there just starve." 
35 Fred Barnes, No Longer Dismissed as Wierdos, Animal-Rights Groups are Now Threat-
ening Medical Research, VOGUE, Sept. 1989, at 542, 542. 
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of any of these processes. On the other hand, any duties we may have 
respecting our treatment of animals derive from the fact that we are 
part of these processes.36 
III. ANIMAL RIGHTS AND MEDICAL RESEARCH 
Medical research involving animals presents a paradigm of the 
contradiction that animal rights theorists face when beneficial human 
activities harm animals by necessity. In order to create a jural con-
struct in which humans and animals possess a measure of equivalence, 
animal rights proponents face their most intractable conundrum in 
circumstances where some measure of animal suffering is essential to 
advance human well-being. Although such conflict may be avoidable 
when it involves food-people can subsist on a vegetarian diet-the 
credible evidence is that in the field of medical research, while there 
may indeed be excesses and unnecessary harms, this conflict cannot 
be sidestepped.37 
An attempt at sidestepping is, however, almost invariably the first 
line of argument advanced by animal rights proponents on this issue. 
"Isn't most animal testing done to benefit medical research?" the 
National Anti-Vivisection Society (N AVS) asks itself in a recent pub-
lication.38 "Absolutely not," is NAVS's answer.39 "Biomedical research 
accounts for only twenty-seven percent of the animals currently being 
used. The majority of this research isn't even published, which means 
it has little or no value. As a result, animal experimentation has had 
no significant influence on the health of the nation."40 Peter Singer is 
36 See infra Section IV. 
37 See, e.g., ROWAN, supra note 12, at 261. 
38 NATIONAL ANTI-VIVISECTION SOC'y, PERSONAL CARE FOR PEOPLE WHO CARE 6 (7th ed. 
1994). 
391d. 
4°ld. (emphasis added). An illustrative analogy is presented by Ingrid Newkirk in her book 
Save the Animals, in which she informs us that "[r]odent infestation is largely preventable." 
INGRID NEWKIRK, SAVE THE ANIMALS 125 (1990). Similarly, PETA informs us that "killing rats 
doesn't work, it only makes space for 'new' rats to fill." D. O'Hara, The Least of Them, 
PETANEWS, Spring 1994, at 9, 11 [hereinafter PETANEWS]. Newkirk goes so far as to 
suggest that human bites are more of a menace to mankind than rodent bites. Newkirk's book 
notes: "Number of reported cases of humans bitten by rats in New York City in 1985: 322. 
Number reported bitten by other people: 1,519." NEWKIRK, supra, at 125. The solution, 
PETANEWS informs us, is to use nonlethal rat traps only, those with "a spring-release trap 
door which allows [people] to take the trap outdoors and release the animal." PETANEWS, 
supra, at 11. 
The truth, however, is that rodents are a tremendous urban problem; a problem in which the 
promotion of human interests almost always involves harming or killing rodents. For example, 
in New York City, where the rodent population is estimated to equal or to exceed the human 
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more subtle in his approach. He writes that "[ w ]hile some of the 
[animal] experiments may have led to advances in medical knowledge, 
the value of this knowledge is often questionable, and in some cases 
the knowledge might have been gained in other ways."41 
While there can be little doubt that some animal research is repeti-
tive and unnecessary-some of the psychological experiments Singer 
describes in lacerating detail seem to be cases in point42-it is mislead-
ing to characterize the role animal research has played in medical 
advances as ambiguously as do Singer and other animal rights propo-
nents. 
Adrian R. Morrison, in Understanding (and Misunderstanding) 
the Animal Rights Movement in the United States, describes the 
importance of basic animal research to advances in medicine.43 Dr. 
Morrison notes that most basic medical research relies upon studies 
using animals.44 In turn, most medical advances rely upon basic medi-
cal research.45 For example, "41% of the papers reporting work judged 
to be fundamentally important to the 10 most important advances in 
cardiology were concerned with studies that sought knowledge for 
the sake of knowledge itself."46 Morrison also recounts how the ap-
pearance of penicillin and the sulfonamides '''did not fall into our laps'" 
but were the product of "'[g]enerations of energetic and imaginative 
investigators [who] exhausted their whole lives on the problem. It 
overlooks a staggering amount of basic research to say that modern 
medicine began with the era of antibiotics."'47 Andrew Rowan lists the 
medical advances, some of them spectacular, that can be traced di-
rectly to animal research.48 
population, rodent-related complaints and reported rat bites are soaring. See Marvine Howe, 
Residents Mobilize to Root Out the Rats, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, § B, at 5. In 1993, the New 
York City Health Department logged more than 22,000 rodent-related complaints, significant 
not only because of its esthetic implication but also because infected rodents can carry a number 
of potentially fatal diseases, including typhus, salmonella, bubonic plague, and the mysterious 
Hantavirus that killed 40 people in the Southwest in 1993. Rajiv Chandradekaran, Mysterious 
Rodent-Borne Virus Found in Virginia, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,1994, at Bl; Howe, supra, at 5. 
4! SINGER, supra note 2, at 65. 
42 See id. at 66-68. 
43 Adrian R. Morrison, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) the Animal Rights Movement 
in the United States (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 150. 
47Id. (quoting LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 117 (1974)). 
48 See ROWAN, supra note 12, at 177-85. Such advances include the discovery and development 
of antibiotics, the discovery and use of insulin to treat diabetics, the victory over polio, and the 
development of advanced surgical techniques. See id. 
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The animal rightists' second line of argument is a fallback to the 
notion that human health does not justify animal suffering. One can-
not argue with this proposition without returning full circle to where 
we began in this Article-a reasonable reverence for human life must 
come first in a human philosophical perspective.49 Morrison, referring 
to historical descriptions of "'infants with ears streaming pus, school-
boys with facial impetigo, beards growing from heavily infected skin, 
faces pocked by smallpox or eroded by lupus, or heads and necks 
scarred from boils or suppurating glands,'" describes us as ''the healthi-
est generation in history."50 To those who believe the statement that 
"[a] life is a life ... [i]f the death of one rat cured all diseases, it 
wouldn't make any difference to me,"51 humanity's movement from 
such miseries is irrelevant. 
Deriding the value of animal research and targeting animal re-
search facilities for particularly venomous and violent campaigns has 
become a cornerstone of the animal rights movement.52 The reason 
49 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
50 Morrison, supra note 43, at 150 (quoting W. PATON, MAN AND MOUSE: ANIMALS IN MEDI-
CAL RESEARCH 93 (2d ed. 1993)). 
51 The statement is attributed to Chris DeRose, head of the Los Angeles-based activist group 
Last Chance for Animals. Elizabeth Venant & David Treadwell, Biting Back: Anirrw,l Re-
searchers, Industries Go on the Offensive Against Increasingly Militant Activists, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 1990, at E 1. 
52 The problem of animal rights extremist harassment of lawful scientific research reached 
such proportions that Congress passed the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992,18 U.S.C. 
§ 43 (Supp. V 1993). As Senator Howell Heflin stated in support of the legislation: "The need 
for this legislation has only intensified with the rising number of break-ins experienced by 
America's leading research institutions and the increase in the number of threats to America's 
research scientists." 137 CONGo REC. S2419--02, S2650 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Heflin). Senator Heflin noted the following several months later: 
Unfortunately, there are some people so opposed to the use of animals in this essential 
research that they are setting fire to research facilities or breaking into laboratories 
to steal animals and destroy equipment, records and research data. There are dozens 
of recent examples. In fact, six major break-ins and thefts at research laboratories have 
been reported across the country since I introduced this legislation in Congress. 
In the most egregious of these incidents, a Texas researcher's federally-supported 
project sustained immediate damages costing $70,000. His basic research that could 
benefit victims of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and those suffering from sleep 
disorders was halted for more than a year. That researcher has been the subject of a 
second break-in attempt, death threats and a hate campaign which continues to this 
day. 
Extremists who perpetrate crimes in the name of animal rights ignore not only the 
rights of others, but also their own rights of free speech. Responsible dissent is 
protected by law-none of us would have it any other way. But ideological terrorists 
and vigilantes who take the law into their own hands must be stopped. Everyone can 
agree that we owe an enormous debt to research animals. Laboratory animals should 
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that medical research-as opposed to farming, eating meat, and pest 
extermination-has been the subject of such extreme activities may 
be more political than philosophical. As Singer has noted, "American 
animal researchers are a smaller and politically less powerful group 
than American farmers, and they are based in regions where animal 
liberationists live. They therefore make a more accessible, and slightly 
less formidable opponent .... "53 
Animal rights strategists are aware of and exploit the relatively 
low profile of, and the relative lack of attention paid to, basic scientific 
and medical research by the public. The symbolic nature of target 
selection is apparent when one compares the readily available evi-
dence of speciesist carnage in every steak house or fried chicken 
outlet in the country with the far more obscure and smaller in mag-
nitude activities concerning animals that occurs in the nation's labo-
ratories.54 It is unlikely that the public would tolerate random bomb-
ings of its restaurants and supermarkets by animal rights extremists 
for very long. 
The selection of animal research facilities as a target for activism is 
also consistent with the anti-intellectual bias of the animal rights 
movement itself. The movement downplays intellect and its accompa-
nying curiosities and ambiguities as a distinguishing feature of hu-
mankind. The notion that there is nothing sacred about the right to 
pursue knowledge is, after all, a central feature of all nonspeciesist 
analysis.55 Those qualities that lead scientists to seek further knowl-
edge-for its own sake or to better the human, and often animal, 
condition-are precisely the human traits that animal rights activists 
brand as speceisist and pointless. 
Animal rights activists must acknowledge the dramatic advances 
in our medical knowledge, and thus our health, longevity, and stand-
be utilized only when necessary and must be well cared for and respected for humane 
as well as scientific reasons. But no one can condone lawless and senselessly destructive 
acts for whatever reason they are motivated. 
137 CONGo REC. SI4,834-01, S14,835 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
53 SINGER, supra note 2, at 37. 
54 The United States Department of Agriculture reported in 1990 that 58% of animal experi-
ments involved no pain or distress at all, 36% required analgesics or anesthetics, and 6% 
involved study of pain mechanisms so that chemical relief was not possible. Morrison, supra 
note 43, at 154 (quoting UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL WELFARE EN-
FORCEMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1990 (1990)). 
55 SINGER, supra note 2, at 92. Compare the comment attributed to Sir George Duckett of the 
British Society for Abolition of Vivisection in 1875 that "[m]edical science has arrived probably 
at its extreme limits ... [and n]othing can be gained by repetition of experiments on living 
animals." STRAND & STRAND, supra note 31, at 13 (quoting Duckett). 
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ard of living, that are attributable to animal research. Once they do 
so, they will be left with an argument that most people will find 
unconvincing-that animals should be protected, even at the expense 
of human lives. 
IV. THE CHALLENGE TO HUMAN FREEDOMS POSED BY ANIMAL 
RIGHTS 
If one analyzes the notion that animals should have rights separate 
and distinct from those protections they have incident to the eco-
nomic, esthetic, and humanitarian interests of human beings, the fol-
lowing four questions must be kept in mind: (1) against whom will 
such rights exist?; (2) when and how will such rights be invoked?; (3) 
who will enforce such rights?; and (4) who will decide what the bounda-
ries of such rights are? 
Reason, history, and an entire intellectual tradition compel a con-
clusion that any notion that the interests of animals either warrant or 
can have expression in a constitutional democracy, wholly independent 
of human interests, risks casting fundamental freedoms on a devious 
course. Thomas Paine once commented that "[c]ivil rights are those 
which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society."56 
Paine also wrote the following at the time of the American and French 
Revolutions: "All power exercised over a nation, must have some 
beginning. It must be either delegated, or assumed. There are no 
other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed power is 
usurpation. Time does not alter the nature and quality of either."57 
Power that arises out of, as opposed to over, the people arises out of 
the consent of the governed,58 and the limits of such delegation are 
carefully defined in a constitution such as ours: 
The fact therefore must be, that the individuals themselves, each 
in his own personal and sovereign right, "entered into a compact 
with each other" to produce a government: and this is the only 
mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only 
principle on which they have a right to exist.59 
Paine defines civil rights as rights with a foundation in "some natural 
right pre-existing in the individual."60 Civil rights in a constitutional 
democracy are those rights the individual reserves to himself after 
56 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 39 (Gregory Claeys ed., 1992). 
57 [d. at 147. 
58 See id. at 41-42. 
59 [d. at 41 (emphasis in original). 
60 [d. at 39. 
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delegating to the government those powers necessary to the orderly 
functioning of society.61 
The question which must arise in the context of any proposal that 
the government endow rights on animals is how such a notion can be 
reconciled with the very definition of "rights" in a constitutional de-
mocracy. Any real acceptance of the notion must mean reposing in the 
government a wholly new and undefined set of powers, presumably 
to be exercised on behalf of an entirely new and vague constituency. 
The notion contemplates the creation of a vast, unprecedented, intru-
sive, and uncircumscribable jurisprudence in which the government 
erects barriers to human conduct on the strength, not of competing 
human interests-be they economic, esthetic, or humanitarian-or 
the delegation of power to it by individuals, but of assumptions about 
the interests of animals assessed by the government apart from hu-
man interests or experience. Not only may this be impossible, but in 
the contemplated nonspeciesist world, where there would be no hier-
archy within the animal kingdom just as there would be no hierarchy 
between humans and animals, the "rights" of individual animals would 
exist in competition with the rights of individual humans. Thus, no rat 
could be harmed, chicken cooked, or rabbit dissected without govern-
ment permission or the prospect of government scrutiny. If some 
government agency were given the power to act in the interest of 
animals, the result would be the creation of a vast, intrusive structure 
which would erect barriers to human conduct on the strength, not of 
competing human interests, but of assessments of the interests of 
animals conducted without reference to human interests or experi-
ence. 
What sort of fearsome bureaucracy would purport to institutional-
ize, standardize, and write regulations pertaining to animals' rights 
and interests implicated by all legislation? What kind of free-ranging 
commissions of inquiry would courts become if the requirements of 
human standing62 were removed and any advocate or group of advo-
cates purporting to speak for any animal were entitled judicial access 
to press the animal's rights and to argue the animal's case? 
The only measure-true north, the touchstone-must be human 
interests. These interests could be aesthetic or humanitarian and 
could seek to weigh all the factors the range of human dialog about 
animals includes. But it is human interest, whether it be in the envi-
ronment, the need to show compassion, or the need to advance sci-
61 See id. at 39-42. 
62 See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text. 
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ence, that must be weighed, not any supposed interest in an anthro-
pomorphized rat or a Disneyfied rabbit. When overpopulation of deer 
threaten a water supply the deer must be culled, and without due 
process for the deer.63 When rabbits ruin vital crops the rabbits must 
be exterminated.64 When human medical advances require vivisection, 
vivisection may continue without unnecessary harm but with such 
harm as may be necessary for its purpose.65 We do not see how a legal 
system in which human rights are enshrined could approach these 
matters differently. Our moral and legal systems cannot accommodate 
a theory that purports to detach decisions as to how we should treat 
animals from an anthropocentric reference point and have these de-
cisions revolve around some other concept, such as that of "civil 
rights" for beings that cannot articulate their own interests and about 
whose true sapience, awareness, knowledge of death, and value of life 
we know so little. 
V. THE SALUTARY BALANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AFFECTING 
ANIMALS 
State and federal legislation that presently regulates human inter-
action with animals is consistent with the views that only humans 
possess rights and that animal suffering may be an unavoidable con-
sequence of some human activities. Such legislation does not address 
animals as beings with rights, but rather as beings toward which 
humans have responsibilities. These responsibilities are derived, not 
from some conception that animals possess claims against humans, 
but rather from a recognition that human interests and esthetic sen-
sibilities are impacted by our treatment of animals. 
The major federal animal legislation, such as the Animal Welfare 
Act (AWA),66 the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA),67 and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA),68 are-like all legislation-products 
of a balancing of competing interests. The interests in the balance are 
the various human interests that may be affected by the way we 
interact with animals; the perceived interests of animals are of imp or-
63 See, e.g., American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 164 (1st Cir. 1993). 
64 See, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Mud Lake Farmers Rabbit Comm., 673 P.2d 408, 408 (Idaho 
1983). 
65 See, e.g., New Jersey Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Educ. of 
E. Orange, 219 A.2d 200, 206 (Essex County Ct. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 227 A.2d 506 (N.J. 
1967). 
66 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
67 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
68 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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tance only insofar as it is assumed that mistreatment of animals, 
especially the gratuitous mistreatment of animals, is unesthetic and 
inconsistent with a humane view of our place in our environment.69 
Notwithstanding the above, animal rights activists invoke these 
statutes in support of their litigation agenda, which has as its aims 
the enfranchisement of animals and the empowerment of people to 
assert the civil rights of individual animals and animal species.70 For-
tunately, courts most often reject the invitation of animal rights ac-
tivists to analyze the issues raised in such cases beyond the confines 
of well-established legal principles.71 
A. State Animal Welfare and Cruelty Statutes 
Most states possess animal cruelty laws that prohibit wanton, pur-
poseless conduct against animals such as torturing, starving, beating, 
mutilating, and other inhumane acts.72 Such laws are premised on the 
idea that the humane treatment of animals is good for people and 
rarely restrict "normal human activities to which the infliction of pain 
to an animal is purely incidental or unavoidable .... "73 For example, 
state animal cruelty laws commonly exempt activities, such as farm-
ing, pest extermination, fishing, and hunting, that have been funda-
mental aspects of human existence for millennia.74 
Some state animal cruelty laws also provide that the infliction of 
pain and death on animals is justified in the name of education and 
scientific progress and expressly exclude research and education from 
their scope. For example, California's health and safety code provides: 
The public health and welfare depend on the humane use of ani-
mals for scientific advancement in the diagnosis and treatment of 
human and animal diseases, for education, for research in the 
advancement of veterinary, dental, medical and biologic sciences, 
for research in animal and human nutrition, and improvement and 
standardization of laboratory procedures of biologic products, phar-
maceuticals and drugs.75 
In addition, Idaho confirms the human "right" to "destroy any ven-
omous reptile, or animal known as dangerous to life, limb, or property 
69 See infra notes 80--94 and accompanying text. 
70 See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. 
72 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 77 (1990). 
73 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 59 (1994). 
74 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 25-3515 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 574.200 (1994). 
75 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1650 (West 1990). 
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... [and] to kill ... all animals used for food or with properly con-
ducted scientific experiments or investigations .... "76 Such statutes 
reflect the view that, while inflicting pain on animals is inhumane in 
many circumstances, there are human activities, and even human 
activities that go beyond those essential to human survival, that have 
benefits that far outweigh the compassionate human impulse to stop 
pain wherever it is found. 
A similar result has been reached in other states by judicial interpre-
tation of more generally worded animal cruelty statutes.77 An early 
decision by the Essex County Court in New Jersey, New Jersey 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Educa-
tion of East Orange, is illustrative.78 The Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) sued the Board of Education of the City 
of East Orange over an experiment involving live chickens.79 A high 
school student, "strongly motivated toward a career in medical re-
search as a doctor and virologist," enlisted the assistance of a biology 
teacher to conduct an experiment which involved injecting four live 
chickens with the Rous sarcoma virus.80 One of the chickens died of a 
cancerous tumor and another was put to death by the student.8! The 
student exhibited the two surviving chickens in a science fair.82 
The SPCA argued that the board of education violated New Jersey's 
animal cruelty statute.83 The statute punished persons who "[o]ver-
drive, overload, drive when overloaded, overwork, torture, torment, 
deprive of necessary sustenance, or cruelly beat or otherwise abuse 
or needlessly mutilate or kill a living animal or creature .... "84 
There is much discussion in the court's opinion about the value of 
the research, in the context of whether the student had "needlessly 
mutilate[d] or killed" the animals or had "inflict[ed] unnecessary cru-
elty" in violation of New Jersey law.85 In the end, the court disagreed 
with the SPCA and determined that the board of education had not 
violated the statute.86 The student's motives, the court found, "were 
76 IDAHO CODE § 25-3515 (1994). 
77 See, e.g., Tauh v. State, 463 A.2d 819, 821 (Md. 1983). 
78 219 A.2d 200 (Essex County Ct. 1966), afI'd per curiam, 227 A.2d 506 (N.J. 1967). 
79Id. at 202. 
80 Id. at 207. Rous sarcoma virus produces cancerous tumors in chickens, particularly young 
chickens.Id. 
8! Id. 
82 I d. at 208. 
83 New Jersey Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 219 A.2d 202. 
84 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-26 (West 1994). 
85 See New Jersey Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 219 A.2d at 207-10. 
86 Id. at 209. 
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of the highest calibre and were purely scientific and educational in 
nature."87 The court also set forth several educational benefits of the 
student's project: (1) to offer the student an opportunity to observe 
life processes which lead to a sympathetic respect for life; (2) to 
provide future citizens with some knowledge of the nature of sciences 
and of the techniques and principles of scientific inquiry; (3) to provide 
future citizens with some knowledge of the principles of health, dis-
ease, and medicine and of some aspects of agriculture; (4) to identify 
the talented student in this field; and (5) to motivate selected students 
to become the medical and biological scientists of the future.88 Under 
such circumstances, the court held that the Board of Education did 
not violate the statute, "even if chickens suffered unduly."89 
The court in New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals v. Board of Education of East Orange struck a reasonable 
balance. Acts that are wanton, cruel, and lack any redeeming quality 
fall within the statute's general prohibition.90 Human interests in hu-
mane animal treatment, however, give way when other human inter-
ests, such as scientific progress, food production, or education are 
particularly compelling.91 As the court explained: 
[T]he specific prohibited acts contained in the [general animal 
cruelty statute] as well as the other sections in the statute indi-
cate a common characteristic-that is, the acts are wanton and 
cruel and have no redeeming qualities .... [E]ducational and 
scientific achievements might well represent the redeeming qual-
ity that would constitute the justification for inflicting pain or 
suffering on animals-to render the cruelty not unnecessary or 
the mutilation not needless. 
I conclude that if there is a truly useful motive, a real and valid 
purpose, there can, under the statute, be acts done to animals 
which are ostensibly cruel or which ostensibly cause pain.92 
It is ironic that the high school student's scientific venture-which 
almost certainly entailed no more, and perhaps less, "suffering" for 
the chickens than their competing fate in a slaughterhouse-should 
have been opposed and subjected to scrutiny while at the same time 
the judge, court personnel, and defense lawyer too, presumably, sat 
down to chicken dinners before, during, and after the proceedings 
with impunity. 
87 [d. at 208. 
88 [d. at 207. 
89 [d. at 210. 
90 See New Jersey Soc'y for the Preention of Cruelty to Animals, 219 A.2d at 206. 
91 See id. 
92 [d. (footnote omitted). 
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Eating, farming, clothes manufacturing, research, and education 
are not the only endeavors in which society must accept some form 
of harm to animals. The Supreme Court has recognized that animal 
sacrifice may be a protected aspect of religious worship. In Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a municipal ban on 
ritual animal sacrifice.93 The Court held that a city ordinance which 
entirely banned ritual animal sacrifice improperly burdened religion 
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.94 In 
so holding, the Court noted that many types of animal killing, such as 
fishing, the extermination of mice and rats, hunting, and euthanasia 
of stray dogs and cats were either permitted or approved of by the 
statute and city ordinance in question.95 
Traditional state animal cruelty statutes reject the absolutist view 
of some animal rights activists: humans' traditional refusal to recog-
nize animal rights is the product of a speciesist perspective; humans 
should never permit the infliction of pain and suffering on any animal, 
no matter how great the corresponding benefits of the activity caus-
ing the harm.96 Such state statutes demonstrate that, while the law 
generally seeks to insure that animals are treated humanely, the law 
also recognizes that people should be free to engage in activities that 
forward their own interests. 
B. The Animal Welfare Act 
Similar principles are reflected in federal animal legislation. The 
Animal Welfare Act (AWA),97 while styled as an animal welfare act, is 
also a codification of the human right to use animals in research. The 
AWA provides for the regulation of certain activities that involve 
animals-including dealing, exhibiting, and researching-by author-
izing the Secretary of Agriculture to establish minimum standards for 
the handling, care, and treatment of animals.98 The AWA also provides 
that researchers should not inflict unnecessary pain and suffering 
upon animals.99 When the infliction of pain and suffering is necessary, 
however, the research may continue as long as the pain and suffering 
is minimized.lOo Thus, although the AWA mandates that research ac-
93 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225-34 (1993). 
94 [d. at 2234. 
95 [d. at 2232. 
96 See supra Section III. 
97 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
98 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
99 [d. § 2143(a)(3). 
100 [d. § 2143(a)(3)(A). 
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tivities be conducted in as humane a manner as possible, the AWA 
still validates the essential merit and legality of various activities 
which are beneficial to humans but which, by their very nature, harm 
animals.lol 
In 1966, when Congress passed the original version of what is now 
known as the AWA, Congress's main concerns were the growing 
number of thefts of dogs and cats for sale to research facilities and 
the shortcomings in the care and treatment that research animals 
received.102 The nation's vast program of medical research, much of 
which involved animal experimentation, had created a significant ani-
mal abduction problem: 
The demand for research animals ha[d] risen to such proportions 
that a system of unregulated dealers [was] supplying hundreds of 
thousands of dogs, cats, and other animals to research facilities 
each year. 
Stolen pets [were] quickly transported across state lines, chang-
ing hands rapidly ... [and] state laws ... proved inadequate both 
in the apprehending and conviction of the thieves who operate[d] 
in this interstate operation .... 103 
In addition to protecting pet owners from theft, legislators also 
sought to balance the well-being of research animals with the need 
for animal experiments in scientific research: 
We have diligently tried to bring back ... an effective bill which 
will codify the noblest and most compassionate concern that the 
human heart holds for those small animals whose very existence 
is dedicated to the advancement of medical skill and knowledge 
while at the same time still preserving for the medical and re-
search professions an unfettered opportunity to carry forward 
their vital work in behalf of all mankind.104 
In sum, the framers of the AWA aimed to upgrade laboratory stand-
ards without impairing the important functions of medical research.lo5 
Later amendments to the AWA reflected this priority.lo6 In 1970, 
Congress expanded the definition of "animal."lo7 Congress also ex-
101 [d. § 2143(a). 
102 See S. REP. No. 1281, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2635. 
103 [d. at 2636. 
104 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1848, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2649,2649 (emphasis added). 
105 [d. at 2637. 
106 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560; Pub. L. No. 94-279, 
90 Stat. 417 (1976); Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1650 (1985) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2131-2159 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
107 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (1970). 
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panded the categories of people regulated by the AWA.108 The 1970 
amendments, however, did not upset the balance between the protec-
tion of laboratory animals and the need for laboratory animals for 
medical research. The House Report which accompanied the 1970 
amendments to the AWA stated that the amendments "represent[ed] 
a continuing commitment by Congress to the ethic of kindness to 
dumb animals" and "demonstrate[d] America:S humanity to lesser 
creatures while maintaining and promoting the national enlighten-
ment in medicine for the care of all mankind."lo9 
The 1985 amendments to the AWA gave the Secretary of Agriculture 
the authority to conduct periodic inspections;l1O authorized regulations 
setting standards for the handling, housing, and feeding of research 
animals;111 and established reporting, training, and internal review 
requirements.l12 The 1985 amendments, nevertheless, preserved the 
researcher's independence by prohibiting the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture from interfering in the "design, outlines, or guide-
lines" of actual research.113 Although the Department of Agriculture's 
regulatory standards must ensure that animal pain and distress are 
minimized, scientific necessity justifies painful procedures.114 Thus, 
"[t]he research scientist still holds the key to the laboratory door."115 
Because the AWA places few real restrictions on animal researchers 
and is premised on the assumption that animals must be harmed and 
killed in the name of scientific progress,116 the AWA does not qualify 
as a true "animal rights" statute. Thus, it is not surprising that animal 
rights activists have been unsuccessful in their attempts to use the 
AWA to pursue their agenda in court. In International Primate Pro-
tection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit made it virtually 
impossible for private citizens to seek relief under the AWA.ll7 The 
Fourth Circuit noted that, although the AWA provides for adminis-
trative supervision over animal welfare, such supervision is subordi-
108 I d. § 2132. 
109 H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 
5104 (emphasis added). 
110 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
111 Id. § 2143(a). 
112Id. § 2143(a)(7), (b), (d). 
113Id. § 2143(a)(6)(A). 
114Id. § 2143(a)(3). 
115 H.R. REP. No. 91-1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 
5104. 
116 See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text. 
117 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987). But see Animal Legal Defense 
Fund v. Secretary of Agric., 813 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1993) (animal rights organizations brought 
action in which regulations regarding nonhuman primates found to be arbitrary and capricious). 
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nated to the continued independence of research scientists.1I8 The 
court held that the AWA "does not imply any provision for lawsuits 
by private individuals .... "119 
To imply a cause of action in [private individuals] might entail 
serious consequences. It might open the use of animals in biomedi-
cal research to the hazards and vicissitudes of courtroom litiga-
tion. It may draw judges into the supervision and regulation of 
laboratory research. It might unleash a spate of private lawsuits 
that would impede advances made by medical science in the alle-
viation of human suffering. To risk consequences of this magni-
tude in the absence of clear direction from the Congress would be 
ill-advised. In fact, we are persuaded that Congress intended that 
the independence of medical research be respected and that ad-
ministrative enforcement govern the Animal Welfare Act.120 
Recent amendments to the Animal Welfare Act have ... reaffir-
med the Congressional finding that "the use of animals is instru-
mental in certain research and education or for advancing knowl-
edge of cures and treatments for diseases and injuries which 
afflict both humans and animals."121 
C. The Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)122 and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA)123 are concerned with the depletion and ex-
tinction of animal species.124 The ESA and the MMPA are essentially 
wildlife management statutes that seek to conserve nature's diversity 
with an eye towards man's long-term interests.125 Neither statute 
contains any provisions that give individual animals enforceable claims 
against people or the state. 
The legislative histories of the ESA and the MMPA reveal a con-
gressional intent to protect wildlife resources, not due to any rights 
or claims inherent in the animals themselves, but rather due to the 
value of the animals to people. As Congress has stated: 
118 International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 939. 
119 I d. at 940. 
12°Id. 
121Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 592 (1985), reprinted in 
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 2518). 
12216 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
123 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
124 See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(2); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
125 See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). 
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From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best 
interest of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. 
The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys 
to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers to 
questions which we have not yet learned to ask.126 
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The ESA is aimed at conserving animal species threatened with ex-
tinction and their habitats, because "these species of fish, wildlife, and 
plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, 
and scientific value to the Nation and its people."127 Similarly, the 
introduction to the MMPA states Congress's determination that the 
health and stability of the marine ecosystem should be maintained 
because "marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources 
of great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as 
economic .... "128 The House of Representatives report accompanying 
the bill which became the MMPA elaborated: 
Some ... groups [formed to advocate stronger protection meas-
ures] have been criticized as unrealistic: as failing to recognize 
that the principal significance of these animals lies in their useful-
ness to men and, by inference, that any use by man is therefore 
justifiable. This attitude, it seems to the committee, is no more 
realistic than that of those on the other end of the spectrum-that 
animals must be left alone altogether. Both fail to recognize that 
man's thumb is already on the balance of Nature, and that solici-
tous and decent treatment for the animals may well also be in the 
long-term best interest of man.129 
Unlike the AWA, neither the ESA nor the MMPA make reference 
to animal pain, suffering, or general well-being. Also, in contrast to 
the view of many animal rights activists/30 the ESA and the MMPA 
protect animals not by virtue of their very existence, but only by 
126 H.R. REP. No. 93-412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), quoted in Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 
828 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D. Mass. 1993). 
127 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). Essentially, the ESA was an aspect of the larger environmental 
protection movement: 
Consideration of this need to protect endangered species goes beyond the aesthetic. 
In hearings before the Subcommittee on the Environment it was shown that many of 
these animals perform vital biological services to maintain a "balance of nature" within 
their environment. Also revealed was the need for biological diversity for scientific 
purposes. 
S. REP. No. 93--307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990. 
128 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6). 
129 H.R. REP. No. 92-707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 
4145 (emphasis in original). 
130 See generally American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993); Citizens To End 
Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 
1993); In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland, 785 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
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virtue of their being members of species whose populations have 
fallen below a certain minimum level.l3l Neither the ESA nor the 
MMPA is rooted in a concern for the rights-or even the interests-of 
the affected animals themselves. Rather, by promoting species con-
servation, the statutes aim to maintain ecological diversity for the 
benefit of people.l32 
In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo illustrates this 
distinction.l33 In Defense of Animals and other animal rights organi-
zations brought suit against the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo to enjoin 
the zoo's plans to move a gorilla named Timmy to the Bronx Zoo for 
mating purposes. 1M In Defense of Animals claimed that the move 
would subject Timmy to needless pain and suffering, in part because 
of his nonproductive "romance" with another Cleveland Metroparks 
Zoo gorilla.l35 In Defense of Animals argued that, as the result of these 
conditions, the move violated the ESA.136 The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio rejected In Defense of Ani-
mals' argument and held that the move would not violate any provi-
sion of the ESA.137 The court's holding clearly reflected the view that 
the ESA's purpose is to preserve and propagate endangered species, 
not to protect the "feelings" of individual animals. l38 
Citizens To End Animal SUffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New 
England Aquarium exemplifies the similar, limited purpose of the 
MMPA.139 Various animal rights groups brought suit against the New 
England Aquarium.l40 The groups contended that the aquarium acted 
unlawfully when the aquarium transferred a dolphin named Kama to 
the N avy.141 The claim was that, under the MMPA, the parties to the 
dolphin transfer were required to obtain a permit, which entailed a 
lengthy and cumbersome process.142 Significantly, Kama was born in 
captivity and therefore the transfer did not have any implications for 
131 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (stating Congressional finding that certain marine mammal species are, 
or may be, in danger of extinction and that measures should be taken to insure that their 
populations are not further diminished). 
132 See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). 
133 785 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
134 Id. at 101. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 103. 
137Id. 
138 See In Defense of Animals, 785 F. Supp. at 101-D3. 
139 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993). 
140 Id. at 46. 
141 Id. at 48. 
142Id. 
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conservation efforts.143 Further, the challenged transfer was from a 
more confining environment to a less confining environment.l44 Thus, 
the plaintiffs' concerns were probably quite different from the con-
cerns that the MMPA was intended to address; most likely the plain-
tiffs sought to make it exceedingly difficult to maintain captive dol-
phins and to prevent any military use of marine mammals.145 The 
plaintiffs' focus was Kama's interests, as perceived by human animal 
rights activists.146 The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts was unreceptive to the plaintiffs' focus and dismissed 
the plaintiffs' claim for lack of standing.147 
In American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, animal rights organizations 
brought an action to enjoin controlled deer hunting in the Quabbin 
Reservation in eastern Massachusetts.l48 Because deer are not an 
endangered species, the plaintiffs grounded their challenge in the 
assertion that the hunting would pose a significant risk to bald eagles 
on the reservation and thereby violate the ESA, which prohibits the 
"taking" of an endangered species.149 The plaintiffs claimed that bald 
eagles would be at risk because the bald eagles would feed on unre-
covered deer killed by hunters and thereby consume lead from the 
lead shot in deer carcasses.150 The plaintiffs urged the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to find that the imposition of a 
"significant risk" on an endangered species-such as the bald eagle-
constituted a taking and that even a "one-in-a-million" risk of harm 
would constitute a "significant risk."151 The First Circuit rejected the 
plaintiffs' argument and held that only "actual harm," and not a nu-
merical probability of harm, could establish a taking under the ESA.152 
These cases illustrate that courts principally view the ESA and the 
MMPA as environmental laws, not as animal rights laws. Courts have 
been unwilling, in cases involving the ESA and the MMPA, to find 
rights or claims inherent in animals themselves. Rather, courts have 
focused on the impacts on the human environment and have refused 
to let the well-being of animals outweigh those impacts. 
143 See id. at 53. 
144 See Citizens To End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, 836 F. Supp. at 47. At the Navy, 
Kama could swim away if he so desired. ld. 
145 See id. at 55. 
146 See id. at 49-50. 
147 See id. at 59. 
148 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993). 
1491d. at 164; see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988). 
150 American Bald Eagle, 9 F.3d at 164. 
151 ld. at 165. 
152 See id. 
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D. The National Environmental Policy Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)153 is concerned 
with the impact of major federal actions on the human environment.154 
On occasion, however, animal rights activists have invoked the NEPA 
for the sole purpose of protecting the quality of life of animals.155 In 
doing so, animal rights activists turn the NEP A's concept of "human 
environment" on its head. 
Under the NEPA, a recommendation or report on a proposal for a 
major federal action "significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment" must contain a detailed statement of the action's envi-
ronmental impact.156 Congress enacted the NEPA to "reverse what 
seem[ed] to be a clear and intensifying trend towards environmental 
degradation."157 Congress hoped to develop a coordinated national 
policy on environmental quality "to assure that man's capacity to 
change his environment is devoted to making that change one for the 
better, while remaining consistent with his future social, economic and 
other needs."158 As the Supreme Court explained, "NEPA was de-
signed to promote human welfare by alerting governmental actors to 
the effect of their proposed actions on the physical environment."159 
Although the NEPA is neither an animal welfare law nor an animal 
rights law, animal rights activists have, on occasion, been able to use 
the NEPA to assert rights on behalf of animals. For example, in 
Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. Department of the Navy, an 
animal rights group successfully used the NEPA to protect animal 
interests instead of the human environment.16o The Progressive Ani-
mal Welfare Society (PAWS) challenged the Navy's plan to use Atlan-
tic bottlenose dolphins at a submarine base in Bangor, Washington.161 
As the United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington explained, PAWS's real concerns were that the dolphins would 
not be able to withstand the cold temperatures of Puget Sound and 
would be isolated in single holding pens.162 PAWS's legal claim, how-
153 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1995). 
155 See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text. 
156 H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 
2753. 
157 I d. at 2760. 
158 Id. at 2759. 
159 Metropolitan Edison v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1982) (emphasis 
added). 
160 725 F. Supp. 475 (WD. Wash. 1989). 
161Id. at 476. 
162Id. at 477. 
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ever, was that the Navy's "deployment" of the dolphins constituted a 
federal action for which an environmental impact statement was re-
quired pursuant to the NEPA.l63 The dolphins, according to PAWS, 
were an integral part of the human environment, and because the 
dolphins were affected, the human environment was also affected.l64 
The court agreed with PAWS. The court held that the Navy's decision 
to use the dolphins was a major federal action under the NEPA that 
required an analysis of the effects of that use on the dolphins them-
selves.l65 
One might ask how the Navy's plan significantly affected the human 
environment. The court's opinion, however, fails to supply an answer. 
Progressive Animal Welfare Society highlights the importance of 
keeping the human environment in clear focus when analyzing claims 
under the NEPA that involve animals. If, as PAWS argued, an impact 
on animal well-being triggers the NEPA, then the "human" part of 
the NEPA's "human environment" requirement is effectively nul-
lified.l66 Some animal rights activists might desire this result, as it 
effectively puts the interests of animals on a level equal with the 
interests of humans. Such a result, however, is supported neither by 
the NEPA's language nor by the NEPA's legislative history.167 More 
fundamentally, such a result is inconsistent with this nation's entire 
people-oriented legal framework. 
VI. THE STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE LEGAL CAMPAIGN FOR 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 
It is in the doctrine of standing that animal rights activists have 
found their greatest obstacle to the extension of legal rights to ani-
mals. The doctrine of standing is grounded in Article III of the Con-
stitution, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over "cases" and 
"controversies."l68 The concept of standing, as recognized and devel-
oped by courts, at times appears tortured and overly technical.169 
Nevertheless, in litigation concerning animals, the standing require-
163 [d. 
164 [d. at 477-78. 
165 Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y, 725 F. Supp. at 479. 
166 Several other cases have involved the claim that an environmental impact statement must 
be prepared in conjunction with a plan for a federal project with anticipated impacts on animal 
well-being. See, e.g., Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Espy, 814 F. Supp. 142, 143 (D.D.C. 1993). 
167 See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
168 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
169 See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
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ment is indispensable because the requirement focuses the relevant 
inquiry on human interests and injuries rather than on animal "inter-
ests" and injuries.170 
The Supreme Court has articulated the constitutional standing is-
sue as "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial pow-
ers on his behalf."171 To satisfy the standing requirement, plaintiffs 
seeking relief in federal court must show that they have suffered a 
concrete, actual injury caused by the alleged legal violation.l72 Plain-
tiffs lack standing to assert a claim based on a "generalized grievance" 
shared by all or a large class of citizens.l73 Furthermore, plaintiffs 
must assert their own legal rights and interests and cannot base their 
claim for relief upon the interests of third parties.174 
The idea of a fish, chimpanzee, bird, or dog filing suit against an 
alleged oppressor may seem absurd, but animal rights proponents 
sometimes try to include animals as named plaintiffs in lawsuits. 
Sometimes, the issue is never addressed directly and the case is thus 
reported so as to give the impression that an animal actually litigated 
the case, as in American Bald Eagle v. BhattiI75 or Mount Graham 
Red Squirrel v. Yeutter. 176 
In Citizens to End Animal SUffering & Exploitation v. New Eng-
land Aquarium, however, the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts recently held that a dolphin named Kama 
could not challenge his owner's plans to transfer Kama to the N avy.177 
In its analysis, the court relied on provisions in the MMPA that 
170 See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text. 
171 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (emphasis in original) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186,204 (1962». 
172 See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. 
173 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
174 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). 
175 9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993). 
176 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991). In Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, a bird 
sued a state agency under the ESA. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1991). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: 
As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, ... the bird (Loxioides 
bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-creeper family, also has legal status and 
wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right . . . represented by 
attorneys for the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and other environmental parties. 
[d. at 1107. It appears that the parties did not actually dispute the appropriateness of having a 
bird as a plaintiff. 
177 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993). 
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expressly authorize suits brought by "persons," not animals.178 The 
court also held that the dolphin did not have capacity to sue under 
Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the dolphin 
did not fall within the section of the Rules entitled "Parties," which 
provides that capacity to sue is determined by the law of the individ-
ual's domicile.179 The court's analysis perhaps need not have been so 
complicated. As previously demonstrated, our legal system simply 
was not designed to resolve interspecies disputes. Without a clear 
conception of the status of animals vis-a.-vis our government and its 
laws, however, courts could stumble into the unprecedented territory 
of animal litigants. 
Because animals do not possess standing to sue, animal laws must 
be enforced either by the government or by individuals and private 
organizations. When a person brings a private action, the law of 
standing mandates that the person be among those actually injured 
by the alleged legal violation and be within the "zone of interests" of 
the relevant statute.l80 The fact that an animal or the animal's habitat 
may have been harmed is simply insufficient to establish standing for 
that animal.181 Thus, in cases brought by individuals and organizations 
under the ESA, the MMPA, the AWA, and the NEPA, the threshold 
inquiry is often how, if at all, people have been injured. 
An animal rights organization or individual activist rarely suffers 
physical or financial injury when a federal animal law is violated. As 
a result, the common strategy is to show that, due to a prior relation-
ship with or experience involving the animal, the individual plaintiff-
or, if an organization, one or more of the organization's members-has 
suffered a psychological or aesthetic injury.l82 As the Supreme Court 
has observed, "the desire to use or observe an animal species, even 
for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for 
purpose of standing."l83 A review of relevant cases indicates that the 
standing hurdle may be overcome if plaintiffs establish that they live 
in the vicinity of the threatened animal's habitat or have visited the 
178 See id. at 47. 
179 See id. at 49. Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the capacity of 
an individual to sue or to be sued "shall be determined by the law of the individual's domicile." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 17. 
180 See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-98 (1987); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 
595 F.2d 467, 474 (9th Cir. 1979). 
181 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-40 (1992). 
182 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme 
Court indicated that injuries to aesthetic interests may satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement. 
See id. at 734. 
183 Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137; see Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734. 
776 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:747 
threatened animal's habitat in the past, have enjoyed observing the 
animal, and have definite plans to observe the animal again in the 
imminent future. l84 
Although the Supreme Court denied standing on the facts, the 
Court implicitly approved of this approach in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife.185 Environmental groups brought suit under the ESA to 
challenge a regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior and the 
Secretary of Commerce.l86 The regulation excluded the activities of 
government agencies in foreign nations from a consultation require-
ment designed to protect endangered species.187 In response to the 
government's argument that none of the members of the environ-
mental groups were harmed by the regulation, the environmental 
groups presented evidence that several of their members had trav-
eled to foreign countries and had observed the habitats of endangered 
species. ISS The environmental groups, however, were unable to con-
vince the Court that any individual had sufficiently definite plans to 
return to the foreign countries.189 The Court thus concluded that the 
alleged injury was too speculative and too remote to serve as the basis 
for a suit.l90 
Other courts have followed the Court's approach in Lujan. In Fund 
for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that members of Fund for Animals suffered 
harm to their esthetic and environmental well-being due to the dimin-
ished opportunities to view wild bison in Yellowstone National Park 
which would result from the defendant's wildlife management plan.191 
The court found that the organization's members would also suffer 
psychological injury if they viewed the killing of bison.l92 Similarly, in 
Fundfor Animals, Inc. v. Espy, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia held that an animal rights organization pos-
sessed standing to challenge a research project involving the capture 
of bison in Yellowstone National Park.193 Central to the court's holding 
184 See, e.g., Animal Protection Inst. of Am. v. Mosbacher, 799 F. Supp. 173, 175-77 (D.D.C. 
1992) (granting standing to whale watchers who had concrete plans to view whales within next 
year). 
185 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
186 See id. at 2135. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at 2138. 
189 See id. 
190 See Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. 
191 962 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). 
192 See id. 
193 814 F. Supp. 142, 150 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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was that the group's members had observed and enjoyed the bison in 
their natural habitat. l94 
As the above cases demonstrate, a plaintiff does not possess stand-
ing when the plaintiff's alleged injury is speculative or when the 
plaintiff's relationship with the affected animals is tenuous or nonex-
istent.195 When plaintiffs are unable to establish that they have ever 
seen or interacted with the animals at issue, a court will refuse to 
entertain the claim.l96 
Laboratory animals present animal rights activists with special 
standing difficulties. Because research animals are not accessible to 
the public, animal research opponents rarely have the opportunity to 
interact with or enjoy the subjects of their concern. Whether or not 
the AWA is violated, animal rights activists cannot establish that they 
have been injured because they cannot establish prior contacts with 
the particular animal at issue. Further, a general concern for the 
humane treatment of animals is insufficient to establish standing. In 
one case on this point, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stated that such concern "may enhance [the plaintiff's] 
legislative access; it does not, by itself, provide entry to a federal 
court."197 
State courts have similarly held that animal rights activists possess 
no personal legal interest in the use of animals in experimentation and 
thus are not proper parties entitled to sue under state animal cruelty 
statutes. For example, in Lewin v. United States Surgical Corp., the 
Appellate Court of Connecticut held that various individuals and 
animal rights organizations were not sufficiently aggrieved by a medi-
cal supplier's use of dogs to demonstrate the use of surgical staples.198 
194 See id. at 149. In an earlier case, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, the 
Court held that members of wildlife conservation groups were injured by the continued whale 
harvesting, which would allegedly result from the Secretary of Commerce's failure to enforce 
whaling quotas against Japan. See 478 U.S. 221, 231-32 & nA (1986). The members' whale 
watching and studying were adversely affected. See id. 
195 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1992). As the Supreme Court 
explained in Defenders of Wildlife, '''some day' intentions-without any description of concrete 
plans ... do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require." Id. 
In denying standing in Animal Lovers Volunteers Ass'n v. Weinberger, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "[aJ mere assertion of organizational interest in a 
problem, unaccompanied by allegations of actual injury to members of the organization, is not 
enough to establish standing." 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985); see International Primate 
Protection League v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 895 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 
1990) (rejecting standing to animal rights organization on three separate grounds). 
196 See Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, 765 F.2d at 938. 
197 International Primate Protection League, 799 F.2d at 938. 
198 575 A.2d 262, 264 (Conn. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 577 A.2d 716 (Conn. 1990). 
778 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:747 
The court summarized the plaintiffs' assertions as follows: "I am a 
member of Friends of Animals; I own a dog; my dog may one day be 
lost or stolen and may then fall into the hands of a dog broker who 
supplies animals to laboratories; and Surgical may eventually gain 
possession of my dog."199 The court held, however, that such concerns 
failed to satisfy the requirement that the plaintiffs have a specific, 
legal, and personal interest in the subject matter of the case.2OO Simi-
larly, in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Institutional 
Animal Care & Use Committee, the Supreme Court of Oregon held 
that PETA did not possess standing to challenge the University of 
Oregon's approval of a grant proposal involving research on the audi-
tory system of barn owls.201 
The tremendous difficulties faced by animal research opponents in 
establishing standing to challenge the treatment of laboratory ani-
mals are illustrated by a recent decision by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concerning the appli-
cability of the AWA to rats, mice, birds, and aquatic animals.202 Two 
individuals and two organizations brought suit against the Secretary 
of Agriculture.203 The plaintiffs contended that the Secretary's exclu-
sion of these creatures from the AWNs definition of "animal" was 
unlawful.204 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia agreed and ordered the Secretary to promulgate new regula-
tions.205 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the ground 
that the plaintiffs did not possess standing.206 One of the individual 
plaintiffs was a psychobiologist who had worked in laboratories in the 
past but was not presently employed in one.207 The court held that, 
although the psychobiologist alleged that she intended to seek such 
employment in the future and would then suffer injury, she lacked 
standing because her injury was too speculative.208 The other individ-
ual plaintiff, a member of an animal care and use committee, also failed 
199 Id. 
200 See id. 
201 817 P.2d 1299, 1303-04 (Or. 1991). 
202 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'g Animal 
Legal Defense Fund v. Madigan, 781 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that Secretary of 
Agriculture had no authority to exclude birds, rats, and mice from AWN.s protections). 
203 Id. at 497. The two organization plaintiffs were the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the 
Humane Society of the United States. Id. 
204 Id. at 497-98. 
205 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Madigan, 781 F. Supp. 797, 806 (D.D.C. 1992). 
206 Animal Legal Defense Fund, 23 F.3d at 504. 
207 Id. at 499-500. 
208 See id. at 500-01. 
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to establish that he suffered any injury in fact.2og The two organization 
plaintiffs had established standing at the district court level by com-
plaining that the exclusion of birds, rats, mice, and aquatic animals 
from the AWNs coverage hampered their ability to gather and dis-
seminate information on the laboratory conditions of these animals.210 
The D.C. Circuit held that this injury was not within the "zone of 
interests" ofthe AWA.211 Thus, as it currently stands, the exclusion of 
rats, mice, birds, and aquatic animals from the AWNs coverage is 
maintained. 
In cases involving our animal laws, the search for an actual human 
injury often leads to tangential inquiries into topics such as the plain-
tiff's vacation preferences and feelings about animals.212 The focus on 
injury in fact, however, is critical because such a focus confines judicial 
inquiry to cases or controversies directly involving people. The reso-
lution of disputes between animals and people or between various 
animal species is simply not within the scope of the judiciary's duties. 
When animal rights activists seek judicial intervention on behalf of 
animals in situations that involve no human injuries, they essentially 
ask courts to make national animal policy and to act as guardians for 
animals, neither of which are proper functions for our courts. Standing 
forces both litigants and courts to address situations involving ani-
mals from a human perspective, the only perspective from which any 
of us are truly qualified to analyze an issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A conviction and often stated belief among animal rights theorists 
is that the precepts of their movement, like others once despised and 
rejected, will gain currency over time, and that "animal rights [are] 
the logical progression in the evolution of natural rights theories."213 
It is standard, indeed almost mandatory, preface to writings by ani-
mals rights activists to allude to the ridicule with which the ideas of 
early abolitionists and suffragettes were received.214 Human attitudes 
209 See id. at 501. 
210 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923, 926 (D.D.C. 1992). 
211 See Animal Legal Defense Fund, 23 F.3d at 501--04. 
212 See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883--89 (1990) (holding plaintiffs' 
affadavits alleging recreational use "in the vicinity" of proposed government action not specific 
enough to satisfy standing requirement of actual injury to plaintiffs); Animal Protection lnst. 
of Am. v. Mosbacher, 799 F. Supp. 173, 175-77 (D.D.C. 1992) (granting standing to whale 
watchers who had concrete plans to view whales in wild within next year). 
213 Goodkin, supra note 16, at 260. 
214 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 2, at i, 1; Mimi Brody, Animal Research: A Call for Legislative 
Reform Requiring Ethical Merit Review, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 437 (1989); Goodkin, 
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towards animals, the movement that seeks to endow animals with civil 
rights tells us, are analogous to the archaic attitudes once expressed 
about women and African-Americans, that the former are "them-
selves childish, frivolous and short-sighted; in a word, they are big 
children all their life long-a kind of intermediate stage between the 
child and the full-grown man,"215 and the latter "a clownish, simple 
creature, at times even lovable within its limitations, but straightly 
foreordained to walk within the Veil."216 Those who express reservations 
about the concept of civil rights for animals implicitly are warned 
thereby that as the concept of "rights" continues to expand exponen-
tially to include more categories ofbeing217-and Professor Stone goes 
so far as to mention "humanoids, computers, and so forth" as potential 
beneficiaries of the rights concept he advances218-their opposition to 
the process will, in time, come to seem quaint, if not distasteful, as 
archaic as does that of the most patriarchal misogenist or chauvinist 
race theorist. 
The analysis that equates animal rights with the rights of women 
and African-Americans is as inappropriate as the equation is distaste-
ful, and the progression upon which those who make it rely is not 
inexorable. For one thing, it is not necessarily true that because 
history is replete with examples of obduracy and ignorance in making 
political distinctions, there is no credibility to the distinctions now 
made between animals and humans. While it may be true that in the 
context of the relatively brief span of American history the experi-
ence of women and African-Americans has been one of ascending from 
subordination to relative political empowerment, it does not follow 
that political empowerment is a constantly expanding process, des-
tined eventually to empower not only animals but even other entities 
supra note 16, at 259; Douglas O. Linder, "Are All Species Created Equal?" and Other Questions 
Shaping Wildlife Law, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 179 (1988); Stone, supra note 4, at 453-55; 
Thomas, supra note 4, at 728. 
215 Stone, supra note 4, at 497 n.128 (quoting A. Schoepenhauer, On Women, in STUDIES IN 
PESSIMISM 105-10 (T.E. Saunders trans. 1893». 
2161d. at 456 n.25 (quoting w.E.E. DuBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 89 (1924». 
217 See, e.g., Goodkin, supra note 16, at 285; Regan, supra note 7, at 515-17. 
218 Professor Christopher D. Stone writes: 
It is not easy to dismiss the idea of "lower" life having consciousness and feeling pain, 
especially since it is so difficult to know what these terms mean even as applied to 
humans. Some experiments on plant sensitivity-of varying degrees of extravagance 
in their claims-include Lawrence, Plants Have Feelings, Too . .. , ORGANIC GAR-
DENING & FARMING 64 (April 1971); Woodlief, Royster & Huang, Effect of Random 
Noise on Plant Growth, 46 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC. AM. 481 (1969); Backster, Evidence 
of a Primary Perception in Plant Life, 10 INT'L J. PARAPSYCHOLOGY 250 (1968). 
Stone, supra note 4, at 479 n.93 (citations omitted). 
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not yet fully identified. One legal writer postulates that as a general 
proposition, "a refusal to recognize rights is a dubious position to take 
in America .... "219 It is doubtful, however, that such a postulation is 
true. There are many claimed "rights" which, particularly so in the 
American political tradition, are roundly refused because they have 
no grounding in morality, culture, or history or because they conflict 
with other valued rights. 
Far from substantiating an argument that history suggests an in-
evitable empowerment of animals, history, in fact, suggests the oppo-
site. For one thing, human history abounds in instances of enslave-
ment and liberation, and the political fortunes of women have varied 
from cultures that are matriarchal to those with prevailing attitudes 
quite different. No society, however, has ever politically empowered 
living animals, with the possible exception of Caligula's Rome. Nor 
should ours do so now. 
Animals are not politically empowered under our current array of 
animal laws. Animals do not possess legal rights as that term is used 
by Professor Christopher Stone;220 animals cannot institute legal ac-
tions; and courts do not consider animals' harms and benefits in grant-
ing and denying legal relief. Instead, our laws properly seek to ensure 
that people treat animals in a way that is consistent with human 
interests-including interests in the preservation of our environment-
and esthetic sensibilities. 
219 Goodkin, supra note 16, at 285. 
220 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
